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Healthcare Investigation Guide 
Recommended Steps for Investigating Single Cases of Hepatitis B Virus (HBV) or 
Hepatitis C Virus (HCV) that are Suspected to be Related to Healthcare Delivery 
PURPOSE 
This toolkit provides a framework for use by state and local health departments to 
investigate possible healthcare-associated viral hepatitis transmission events, 
particularly those involving only a single patient.  Investigation of these single cases is 
an important public health response as it can result in the identification of an outbreak 
or unsafe clinical practices that are putting additional patients at risk. 
These steps are intended to address a variety of inpatient, outpatient, and long-term 
care settings but not specifically transplant or transfusion-related HBV or HCV 
transmissions, for which additional guidance is under development.  
 
Summary Steps: 
Step 1. Verify the diagnosis of acute hepatitis B or hepatitis C virus infection.  Does the 
index patient meet any of the following criteria suggestive of a new infection?   
      A.  Acute hepatitis B virus infection 
      B.  Acute hepatitis C virus infection 
Step 2.  Use information obtained from patient interview and standard case 
investigation, conducted in step 1, to weigh the likelihood that the index patient’s 
infection is due to healthcare versus non-healthcare exposures. 
If warranted, continue with steps 3-5 
Step 3. Enter information into the healthcare investigation database to identify future 
patterns. 
Step 4.  Assess healthcare encounters that occurred during the index patient’s likely 
exposure period and look for additional related cases. 





Outbreaks of healthcare-associated viral hepatitis infections in the United States 
demonstrate the transmission risk posed by breaches in infection prevention and 
control practices in healthcare settings. These outbreaks serve as a reminder that, in 
addition to traditional risk factors like injection drug use, healthcare encounters should 
be considered when evaluating potential sources of infection among new, acute cases of 
HBV or HCV infection.   
The investigative steps described in this toolkit are not rigid or linear; some steps may 
need to occur simultaneously or in a sequence that varies during the course of an 
investigation. For example, several steps may have already been performed by health 
departments during their routine evaluation of reports of acute hepatitis 
infection.  Further, evidence of a more widespread problem (e.g., additional cases) may 
emerge requiring urgent action (e.g., patient notification).  Many of the steps described 
below rely on review of viral hepatitis surveillance data and chronic viral hepatitis 
disease registries maintained by the health department, which may vary based upon 
state or locality.  Surveillance data, in addition to review of complaints captured by 
regulatory authorities (e.g., state survey agencies, medical and nursing boards) and 
information captured in the healthcare investigation database described in the 
algorithm, can serve as a helpful tool for prioritizing investigation steps and identifying 
infections potentially associated with specific healthcare providers, facilities, and/or 
other patients.   
Ultimately, each investigation is unique and may require careful planning and periodic 
reassessments to determine the appropriate actions that should be taken with 
consideration to personnel, resources, or other competing priorities within the state or 




Step 1.  Verify the diagnosis of acute hepatitis B or hepatitis C virus 
infection.  This should be accomplished through medical record 
review and interview of both the physician who made the diagnosis 
and the index patient using a standardized form  [PDF - 6 pages]. 
 
This form evaluates exposures occurring in a defined time period prior to symptom 
onset.  However, the majority of acute HBV and HCV infections are asymptomatic.  The 
time periods for data collection should correspond to the time between exposure and the 
time in which symptoms or positive serologic laboratory markers for disease may 
appear.  Typically this is:    
• Acute HBV infection:  6 weeks to 6 months  
• Acute HCV infection:  2 weeks to 6 months  
In certain instances, this time period may need to be extended.  For example, in the case 
of a documented seroconversion (e.g., anti-HCV negative to anti-HCV positive), the time 
period should include the 6 months prior to the most recent negative test result up until 
the time of the first positive test result.   
A. Acute hepatitis B virus infection:  
Presence of symptoms is a key factor in differentiating acute infections from chronic 
infections and should be assessed.  Symptoms may include jaundice, dark urine, nausea, 
vomiting, abdominal pain, loss of appetite, fatigue, and joint pain. However, the 
majority of acute HBV infections are asymptomatic.  To consider a case as acute, health 
departments should rely on medical history and information obtained from case 
investigation along with serologic findings with or without symptom onset.   
Serologic markers indicating acute infection:  
positive hepatitis B surface antigen (HBsAg) and 
positive hepatitis B IgM core antibody (IgM anti-HBc).  
B. Acute hepatitis C virus infection:  
There are no serologic markers to differentiate between acute and chronic hepatitis C 
infection.   Presence of symptoms is a key factor in differentiating acute infections from 
chronic infections and should be assessed.  Symptoms may include jaundice, dark urine, 
nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, loss of appetite, fatigue, and joint pain. However, the 
majority of acute HCV infections are asymptomatic.  Therefore, health departments 
should also consider medical history and information obtained from case investigation 
along with a new finding of  hepatitis C antibody or RNA positivity in a person not 
previously known positive (whether or not symptoms or ALT elevation are present).   
  
Step 2. Use information obtained from Step 1 to assess overall 
exposure history and weigh the likelihood that infection is due to 
healthcare versus non-healthcare exposures.   
For example, a remote history of an STD, incarceration, or injection drug use would not 
necessarily outweigh a healthcare encounter occurring during the likely exposure 
period.  If behavioral or household exposures are identified and determined to be likely 
modes of transmission, then investigation of healthcare encounters (steps 4 and 5) may 
not be warranted.   
Examples that are concerning for healthcare transmission and deserve thorough 
investigation include diagnosis of acute hepatitis B or C (or documented 
seroconversion) occurring in a cancer, hemodialysis or transplant patient, long-term 
care resident, a child in the absence of infected household members, or routine blood 
donor. 
  
Step 3. Enter data into healthcare investigation database to identify 
future patterns. 
Whether or not investigation of healthcare encounters is pursued, health departments 
should consider entering relevant information into an electronic database in the event 
that additional cases with matching encounters are reported in the future.   
At a minimum, the database should capture the following information:   
• name of the healthcare facility and/or providers  
• date investigation initiated  
• disease  
• county  
• lead investigator  
• identity of case being investigated  
• status of the investigation     
  
Step 4. Assess healthcare encounters that occurred during the 
index patient’s likely exposure period and look for additional 
related cases. 
 
A. Generate a chronologic listing of all healthcare encounters during the index patient’s 
likely exposure period.  
B. Determine the nature and types of procedures performed during each healthcare 
encounter, especially those involving percutaneous exposures (e.g., injections, infusions, 
skin puncture with a needle/lancet) 
C. Review  healthcare investigation database (see item 3) and regulatory/medical board 
reports/complaints to determine if the healthcare facility and/or providers have been 
under investigation.  Enter the facility/provider(s) into the healthcare investigation 
database (step 3) 
D. Contact the healthcare facility to inform them of the investigation and determine if 
they were aware of the current case(s) under investigation or any additional infections. 
E. Evaluate the healthcare facility  
1. Steps to follow if a single healthcare encounter is identified:  
a. Conduct a site visit at the facility.  
i. Gather general information about the types of 
services/procedures provided by the facility.  
ii. Review facility records for the index patient.   
Information to assess includes whether patient was previously 
known to be infected, how many visits occurred during the 
exposure period, procedures performed during visits including 
healthcare personnel involved in care, equipment used, 
medications administered, room(s) where procedure(s) were 
performed.  
iii. Review infection prevention and control practices at 
the facility.   
Observe the same procedures as those performed on the index 
patient, ideally by the same healthcare personnel.  Focus on 
medication handling and equipment that is used for more than 
one patient (see infection prevention and control check-
list).  Evaluation of infection prevention and control practices 
should also assess the potential for facility staff to be the source 
of infection (e.g., through diversion of narcotics, sexual abuse 
of residents). 
If actual procedures are not being performed during the site 
visit, consider having healthcare personnel perform mock 
procedures so typical practices can be observed and assessed.  
b. Obtain patient list.  
Obtain a list of patients seen on the same day and an appropriate time 
period before and after the index patient to develop a chronologic 
listing of patients who may represent additional cases or sources of 
infection for the index patient. 
The appropriate time period before and after the index patient visit is 
typically 1-2 days, but the cohort selected will depend on a number of 
factors including number of visits the index patient had at the facility, 
the volume of patients seen at the facility, the types of procedures 
being performed, and the infection prevention practices observed 
during the site visit.  For example, if the facility was a hospital, the list 
might only include patients from the relevant unit or patients who 
overlapped in the same operating room.  
c. Use appropriate methods to identify additional cases  
Cross-match patient list obtained from the facility with acute and 
chronic disease registries or hepatitis laboratory reports to identify 
additional cases and/or potential sources for the index patient’s 
infection. 
If the index patient’s exposure was recent, cross-match might not be 
efficient as infected patients may not have been reported and entered 
into the system.  Also, disease registries may be incomplete.  In this 
circumstance, targeted testing of patients to identify additional cases 
may be preferable. CDC is available for assistance or consultation on 
best practices for conducting patient screening.  
2. If multiple healthcare encounters are identified, health 
departments should prioritize the investigation of encounters 
based on the following:  
• information obtained on the facilities/providers from review of their healthcare 
investigation database (step 3) and regulatory/medical board complaints  
• types of procedures the facility performed on the index patient (prioritize those 
involving percutaneous exposures e.g., injections, infusions, skin puncture with 
a needle/lancet)  
• timing of procedures the facility performed on the index patient in relation to 
symptom onset within the likely exposure period (see step 1 – Verify the 
diagnosis)  
• settings and procedures where outbreaks have been previously documented [PDF 
- 8 pages] .  
  
If a complete investigation (e.g., site visit, cross-matching patient lists) of all healthcare 
encounters is not possible, then health departments should, at a minimum, consider the 
following for each of the healthcare facilities identified:  
a. Send a follow-up letter to all healthcare facilities and/or providers identified 
during the investigation to remind them that this is an opportunity to review 
their infection prevention practices.  A letter based upon one used by the 
New York State Department of Health has been provided as one 
example  [DOC - 2 pages].  
b. Continue to monitor state/local health department surveillance data for the 
next several months to ensure no additional cases are identified/reported 
which are linked to any of the facilities/providers in question.  
  
Step 5.  Responding to information identified during assessment of 
healthcare encounters  
 
A. Site visit identifies major breaches in infection prevention and control 
that are high-risk for bloodborne pathogen transmission (e.g., syringe reuse 
from patient to patient or to reenter medication vials used for more than one patient). 
Health departments can consult these resources (Annals.org resource [PDF - 8 pages] , 
CDC.gov resource) for information on high-risk breaches.  
1. Facility should be immediately advised to stop unsafe practices.  
2. A patient notification recommending bloodborne pathogen testing should be 
conducted.   
The scope of the patient notification will depend largely on how long the 
unsafe practice had been occurring in the facility.  CDC is available for 
consultation on best practices for conducting a patient notification.  
3. The facility/provider(s) should be reported to the appropriate regulatory 
authority (e.g., medical or state licensing board).   
B. If the site visit does not identify major breaches in infection prevention 
and control, then results obtained from case finding, cross-matching, and 
record review to identify potential sources should guide next steps. 
1. Additional cases are identified  
a. Evaluate cases’ temporal and geographic overlap in the healthcare 
facility and use of shared medications and/or equipment as well as 
common exposures unrelated to healthcare.  
b. Pursue additional case finding through targeted notification and 
testing of patients. The time frame of targeted notification and testing 
will depend on findings/possible mechanism of transmission 
identified during the site visit.   
c. Consider obtaining blood specimens to allow for genotyping or viral 
sequencing of cases.  However, depending on the mechanisms of 
transmission, viruses from cases may not be related to each other, 
despite transmission occurring in the facility.  For example, there may 
be more than one source patient for the identified cases.  In addition, 
source patients may not be identified for all cases. We recommend 
that these and other limitations be discussed with CDC before 
pursuing laboratory testing in this context.  
2. Potential source patient(s) identified but not additional cases  
a. Assess relatedness of samples from index patient and potential source 
patient(s).   
i. If available, viral genotype information should be determined 
from available medical records.   
ii. Alternatively, attempt to arrange for testing of index patient 
and potential source patient samples, to be performed locally 
(e.g., by the state/local health department laboratory).  
iii. If genotypes match, consider the potential benefit of additional 
viral sequencing.   
If warranted, coordinate with the CDC Division of Viral 
Hepatitis or other laboratory capable of HBV/HCV viral 
sequencing to ship specimens for testing.  If collecting new 
samples, aliquot into multiple 0.5ml aliquots.  For potential 
long-term storage, store frozen between -20°C – -70°C.  Serum 
and plasma (red top tubes) are generally acceptable, avoid 
heparinized (purple top) tubes.  
b. If test results indicate relatedness between the viruses from the 
potential source and index patient (either through genotype or viral 
sequencing) consider additional case finding through targeted 
notification and testing of patients.   
c. If either of the patients refuse or do not have sufficient sample 
available for additional testing, targeted notification and testing of 
patients can also be used to find additional cases.   
d. If test results indicate that the virus from the potential source(s) and 
index patient are not related,  
i. send a follow-up letter to all healthcare facilities and/or 
providers identified during the investigation to remind them 
that this is an opportunity to review their infection prevention 
practices.  A letter based upon one used by the New York State 
Department of Health has been provided as one 
example  [DOC - 2 pages].  
ii. Continue to monitor state/local health department surveillance 
data for the next several months to ensure no additional cases 
are identified/reported which are linked to any of the 
facilities/providers in question.  
3. If additional cases or potential source patients are not 
immediately identified 
Consider sending a follow-up letter to the healthcare facilities and/or 
providers identified during the investigation and continue to monitor 
surveillance data.   
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